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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 11, 2017, a Google spreadsheet that collected allega-
tions of assault, harassment, and "creepy behavior" of male coworkers
began circulating among female employees in the media industry.'
Viewers had the ability to add their own accusations to the spread-
sheet, which had columns for an employee's name, media affiliation,
and accused behavior. 2 While the list was initially privately distribut-
ed among media industry employees, 3 the link to the sheet could be
* Ph.D. student in public policy, Harvard University; J.D. 2017, Harvard Law School;
A.B. 2011, Harvard College.
1. Doree Shafrir, What To Do With "Shitty Media Men "?, BUZZFEED (Oct. 12, 2017,
12:48 AM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/doree/what-to-do-with-shitty-media-men [https:/
pena.cc/7QHQ-5P6S].
2. Jia Tolentino, The Whisper Network After Harvey Weinstein and "Shitty Media Men,"
NEW YORKER (Oct. 14, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-whisper-
network-after-harvey-weinstein-and-shitty-media-men [https://perna.cc/84CL-CAFD];
Shafrir, supra note 1.
3. Tolentino, supra note 2.
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accessed by anyone. 4 By early Thursday morning- less than 24
hours later- a BuzzFeed article reported on the existence of the list,
which turned private,5 and a plethora of thinkpieces began debating
the spreadsheet's merits.6 Journalists talked about their experiences of
seeing colleagues on the so-called "Shitty Media Men" list,7 while a
right-wing pundit threatened to publish names from the list.8
In describing her experience with the spreadsheet in The New
Yorker, Jia Tolentino categorizes the Shitty Media Men list as an ex-
ample of a "whisper network," that is, "the unofficial information
channel that women use to warn each other about men whose sexual
behavior falls on the spectrum from creepy to criminal." 9 There are
whisper networks in many contexts; 10 for example, when colleagues
warn each other about a boss's touchy behavior."
Only recently has technology been used to collate allegations or
to prevent sexual assault. The distribution and subsequent publicity of
the Shitty Media Men list can help illustrate the legal difficulties that
arise from using technology to do so. First, one fear is that data collec-
tion of allegations could lead to false allegations. 12 That is, there is a
tradeoff between the ease with which someone can make an allegation
of assault and the likelihood of a false allegation. Falsely accused in-
dividuals may face undeserved stigma, and the first instance of a false
allegation could undermine credibility of the entire spreadsheet.
How accusations are sourced is a related concern. A false record
is difficult to correct when it is not clear where that record began.'3 In
the Shitty Media Men list, anyone could post an allegation - whether
true or false. 14 Even if a false accusation were deleted, the spreadsheet
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See generally id.; see also Michael Calderone & Jason Schwartz, Blogger Amends Vow
To Publish List of "Shitty Media Men, " POLITICO (Oct. 25, 2017, 9:11 PM), https:/www.
politico.com/story/2017/10/25/cemovich-media-harass-list-244180 [https://perma.cc/ZS6J-
EWAC].
7. See Tolentino, supra note 2; see also Katy Waldman, This Week, It Was Particularly
Rough To Be a Woman, SLATE (Oct. 13, 2017, 7:29 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/
xx factor/2017/10/13/in the wake of the harvey weinstein scandal it feel rough to be
a woman.html (last visited May 5, 2018).
8. Calderone & Schwartz, supra note 6.
9. Tolentino, supra note 2.
10. See Summer Meza, What is a Whisper Network" How Women Are Taking Down Bad
Men in the #MeToo Age, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 22, 2017, 1:51 PM), http:/
www.newsweek.com/what-whisper-network-sexual-misconduct-allegations-719009
[https://perma.cc/P6DP-QXGC].
11. See Tolentino, supra note 2; see also Meza, supra note 10.
12. See Moira Donegan, I Started the Media Men List, THE CUT (Jan. 10, 2018, 10:12
PM), https://www.thecut.com/2018/01/moira-donegan-i-started-the-media-men-list.html
[https://perma.cc/8N3X-VU5R].
13. See generally Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
14. See Tolentino, supra note 2; see also Shafrir, supra note 1; Donegan, supra note 12.
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history would record changes to the sheet,' 5 which would deter accu-
rately accused individuals from deleting the relevant accusation.
As Tolentino points out, "[t]he whisper network is an informal
but relatively orderly reporting method, regulated by the direct ac-
countability of a social ecosystem: if I give you false information,
then my credibility and relationships will suffer."' 6 At face value, an
anonymized, publicly viewable spreadsheet may appear to lack direct
accountability. However, that the spreadsheet was intended for and
privately distributed among media employees lent it initial credibility
to newcomers to the industry. By January 2018, the originator of the
Shitty Media Men list, Moira Donegan, revealed herself in an article
on New York Magazine 's The Cut.17 As she noted, "to make [the list] I
relied on backchannels and friendships that I only developed after
having been in media for some time ... I didn't have this information
when I was 22, interning ".... 18
At the same time, a sexual assault survivor has privacy concerns
of her own. The process of reporting an experience publicly can be re-
traumatizing, with significant consequences even when reporting a
true claim. 19 Donegan, for example, feared being outed when a Har-
per's Monthly fact checker called Donegan to ask if she was indeed
the originator of the spreadsheet.20 Donegan's precautions in main-
taining anonymity appear to have failed.
While technology can enable anonymity and information dissem-
ination, these features should be reckoned with when discussing a
platform that may generate accusations of criminal behavior or may
lead to further intimidation of survivors. When someone is accused of
sexual assault in a criminal adjudication, the prosecution must show
that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt z.2 In a campus
setting, until earlier this fall, the relevant standard for disciplinary
action against a student accused of sexual harassment was the "pre-
ponderance of the evidence" standard.2 2 At present, universities may
choose between maintaining the preponderance standard or using the
more demanding standard of "clear and convincing evidence" in their
adjudications.2 3 Opponents of the Shitty Media Men list claim that
15. See What's Changed in a File, GOOGLE, https:Hsupport.google.com/docs/
answer/190843 [https:Hperma.cc/62BH-DDGE].
16. Id.
17. Donegan, supra note 12.
18. Id.
19. See Eliza Gray, Why Victims of Rape Don't Report to the Police, TIME (June 23,
2014), htp://time.com/2905637/campus-rape-assault-prosecution/ [htp://perma.cc/4PQY-
ZMQH].
20. Donegan, supra note 12.
21. See, e.g., Julie Novkov, Equality, Process and Campus Sexual Assault, 75 MD. L.
REV. 590, 598 (2016).
22. See DEP'T. OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER 10-11 (2011).
23. See DEP'T. OF EDUC., Q&A ON CAMPUS SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 5 (2017).
No. 2]
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology
24men are being accused of actions without regard to due process,
while others argue that it is precisely because few accusations are re-
ported to authorities that a spreadsheet or other mechanism is neces-
sary.
25
In the seven years since the Department of Education laid out
standards for university investigations of sexual assault in its 2011
Dear Colleague letter,26 commentators have argued that harassment
prevention is "now an exploding industry with ... all kinds of crash
courses on how to get and give consent. '27 This Note considers these
legal issues around the use of technology for predicting and reporting
sexual misconduct. Part II provides a brief overview of the existing
technologies on the market and evaluates their benefits and draw-
backs. Part III evaluates these technologies with regard to both priva-
cy concerns and user experience, offering specific suggestions for
design.
II. TECHNOLOGIES FOR SEXUAL MISCONDUCT PREVENTION
Different technologies use different points of intervention that oc-
cur prior to, during, or after misconduct. This Part describes existing
examples of interventions chronologically and evaluates whether their
features and purposes can successfully work towards reducing sexual
assault generally.
A. Prevention
One set of existing smartphone apps seeks to prevent an initial as-
sault from occurring, primarily by making it easier for a potential tar-
get to ask for help. For instance, during a government hackathon,28 a
team of sexual assault survivors developed Circle of 6, a smartphone
app that allows users to create a circle of friends who they can mass
24. See, e.g., Katie Roiphe, The Other Whisper Network, HARPER'S (Mar. 2018),
https:Hharpers.org/archive/2018/03/the-other-whisper-network-2/2/ [https://perna.cc/4W
WX-FBG7].
25. See, e.g., Casey Quinlan, The Shiny Media Men List and Other Ways Women Can
Report Misconduct, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 13, 2018, 9:59 AM), https://www.theguardian
.comiworld/2018/jan/13/sexual-harassment-shitty-media-men-list-examples [https:perna.
cc/XXL6-SKQ9].
26. See generally DEP'T. OF EDUC., supra note 22.
27. See Tovia Smith, Curbing Sexual Assault Becomes Big Business on Campus, NPR
(Aug. 12, 2015, 4:42 PM), https://www.npr.org/2015/08/12/430378518/curbing-sexual-
assault-becomes-big-business-on-campus (last visited May 5, 2018).
28. See Apps Against Abuse Hackathon, DEVPOST, https:/appsagainstabuse.
devpost.com' [https:Hperna.cc/EDV7-SX68].
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text with their location when they feel unsafe. 29 That is, the app al-
lows you to contact all six friends with one button and prepopulated
texts, increasing the likelihood that at least one will respond immedi-
ately and reducing the time it takes to ask for help. Other apps, such
as RaveGuardian, allow users to send alarms or GPS signaling to in-
dividual contacts,30 particularly when the user is walking alone,3' and
to record an incident.3 2 Accordingly, these apps are also used for other
purposes, i.e., for indicating school emergencies3 3 or to record bully-
ing in schools.34 While smartphones typically have the capability to
send their location to others,35 these apps reduce the effort it takes to
do so while providing specific context.
A second set of smartphone apps allow participants to record their
alcohol levels or a verbal indication of consent.3 6 The theory behind
the development of these apps is that both a potential accuser or de-
fendant can benefit from video or audio proof supporting an allegation
that an encounter was consensual or non-consensual.37 We-Consent,
for example, is an app where each party to a sexual encounter records
themselves on video giving verbal consent.38 Developed by an institu-
29. See Juana Summers, Smartphone Apps Help To Battle Campus Sexual Assaults, NPR
(Aug. 13, 2014, 4:32 AM), https://www.npr.org/2014/08/13/339888170/smartphone-apps-
help-to-battle-campus-sexual-assaults (last visited May 5, 2018).
30. RAVEGUARDIAN, http://www.raveguardian.com/ [https:Hpenna.cc/ME99-XA4V];
see also Lauren Kassien, 5 Apps Fighting Back Against Sexual Assault, PASTE (Feb. 6,
2015, 9:09 AM), https://www.pastemagazine.com/articles/2015/02/five-apps-fighting-back-
against-sexual-assault.html [https://perna.cc/JZP8-KYNG].
31. See Virtual Safety: In Wake of Sex Assaults, 'Buddy' Apps Track Users Walking
Alone, CTVNEwS (Apr. 1, 2016, 10:56 PM), https://www.ctvnews.ca/sci-tech/virtual-
safety-in-wake-of-sex-assaults-buddy-apps-track-users-walking-alone-1.2842547 (last visit-
ed May 5, 2018).
32. See Jordana Cepelewicz, The Apps that Are Changing American Cities, POLITICO
(June 10, 2014), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/06/apps-that-are-changing-
american-cities-107678 [https://perna.cc/NZN9-U3SA].
33. See Anaya Bhattacharya, The US Navy is Trying To Deal with its Sexual Assault
Problem by Giving Sailors a Reporting App, QUARTZ (Dec. 9, 2016),
https:Hqz.com/858321/us-navy-on-duty-sexual-assault-prevention-app/ [https:Hperna.cc/
FTW8-DGRA].
34. See Rebecca Greenfield, Harassment Hotlines Don't Work. Will Apps?, BLOOMBERG
(June 13, 2017, 5:15 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-13/can-apps-
get-victims-to-report-workplace-harassment [https://perna.cc/7539-662S].
35. See, e.g., Brian Chen, When You Should (or Shouldn 't Share Your Location Using a
Smartphone, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/12/technology/
personaltech/using-location-sharing-appshtml (last visited May 5, 2018).
36. See Mehak Anwar, "We-Consent " App Aims To Decrease Sexual Assault and Rape,
But Can Apps Really Solve the Problem?, BUSTLE (July 16, 2015),
https://www.bustle.com/articles/97697-we-consent-app-aims-t4o-decrease-sexual-assault-
and-rape-but-can-apps-really-solve-the-problem [https://perna.cc/6S9R-UA2A]; Emily
Cegielski, "Yes Means Yes, " But New Consent Apps Draw Concern from College Students,
WOMEN IN THE WORLD (July 28, 2015), https://womenintheworld.com/2015/07/28/yes-
means-yes-but-new-consent-apps-draw-concern-from-college-students/
[https://perna.cc/NF7R-XRM8].
37. See Anwar, supra note 36.
38. Id.
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tion called the Institute for the Study of Coherence and Emergence,
the app is meant to be used before an encounter.3 9 A video prompts
users to choose "Yes," "No," or "Forced Yes.".40 "If one party says
'no' the video record self-destructs ... but the response 'forced yes'
will create a record of the coercion."'41 The videos are stored on We-
Consent's servers for seven years.
4 2
Good2Go, a similar app, asks first for consent, then for an indi-
vidual's self-perceived level of intoxication.43 The options given are
"No, Thanks," "Yes, but.., we need to talk," and "I'm Good2Go.
44
If the user states that he is "Pretty Wasted," then the app informs him
that he is unable to consent. 45 The user then passes the phone to his
potential partner, who views the level of intoxication and consent of
his partner, then presses a button to consent.
46
Most recently, a Dutch company launched "LegalFling," an app
that sends potential partners information requests including the sexual
preferences of the other individual (e.g., condom usage). If both part-




In addition to the whisper network discussed above- which
could be categorized as a relatively informal, industry-based net-
works - harassment may be reported after sexual misconduct occurs
through venues occasionally provided by the institution the survivor is
associated with, such as their employer or university. Some employers
have created anonymous hotlines to report misconduct.48 At Google,
an email list called "Yes, at Google" provides a venue for employees
39. See WE-CONSENT, http://we-consent.org/ [https://perna.cc/YAH3-RZ9S].
40. See App Store Preview: We-Consent, APPLE, https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/we-
consent/id964520119?mt-8 (last visited May 5, 2018).
41. Id.
42. See Anwar, supra note 36.
43. See Amanda Hess, Consensual Sex: There's an App for That, SLATE (Sept. 29, 2014,
9:17 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx factor/2014/09/29/good2go a new app for




47. See Valentina Zarya, Is Blockchain the Answer to Sexual Consent?, FORTUNE (Jan.
16, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/01/16/consent-app-me-too/ (last visited May 5, 2018).
48. See Noam Scheiber, Anonymous Harassment Hotlines Are Hard To Find and Harder
To Trust, N.Y. TImmS (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/21/business/
media/fox-sexual-harassment-hotline-bill-oreilly.html (last visited May 5, 2018). The hot-
line trend is also observed in non-workplace settings: the band Speedy Ortiz provide a hot-
line when attendees perceive unsafe behavior. See Matthew Strauss, Speedy Ortiz Open
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to anonymously disseminate incidents of harassment. 49 Kaiser Perma-
nente uses the StopIt application, which allows individuals to report
harassment with multimedia evidence directly to an HR department.5"
Finally, some universities allow assaults to be reported via
smartphone apps. 1'
The platform Callisto has been adopted widely.52 Callisto, a non-
profit whose current clients include universities and the comedy
school Upright Citizens Brigade, is an online platform where survi-
vors have three options: "1) create a time-stamped, secure record of
sexual assault, 2) report electronically by sending a record to the
school, or 3) only notify the school if another student names the same
perpetrator."53 That is, if multiple people report the same person, their
records would be jointly sent to the school. Because the record is
time-stamped,5 4 officials can see the time between when the miscon-
duct allegedly occurred and when the account was written. Callisto
utilizes the concept of "information escrows."55 An "information es-
crow" is a third-party agent that holds on to the relevant information
56
and disseminates it when others report similar behavior or the same
bad actor to the escrow.57 Individuals may not wish to be the first to
report problematic behavior,58 because of the relatively high costs
49. See Ellen Huet & Mark Bergen, At Google, an Employee-Run Email List Tracks
Harassment and Bias Complaints, BLOOMBERG (May 23, 2017, 6:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-23/at-google-an-employee-run-email-
list-tracks-harassment-and-bias-complaints [https://perma.cc/CK4P-3JE9].
50. See Greenfield, supra note 32.
51. See Jamie Brensilber, Students Can Now Anonymously Report Sexual Assaults
Through Penn Guardian App, THE DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN (Apr. 27, 2016, 2:34 AM),
http://www.thedp.com/article/2016/04/student-report-sexual-violence-penn-guardian-app
[https://perra.cc/NL8W-Q6BY]; Sarah Rich, App Helps Victims Report Sexual Assault
Anonymously in DC, GOV. TECH (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.govtech.com/health/App-
Helps-Victims-Report-Sexual-Assault-Anonymously-in-DC.html [https://perma.cc/V8GN-
2SE2] (describing an app modelled after one used in D.C. area universities).
52. See generally 2016-2017 School Year Report, CALLISTO (2017), available at
https://www.projectcallisto.org/Callisto Year 2 highres.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XDP-
E4SX]. Its donors include entities such as Google.org, with over $500,000 reported in funds
raised during the first 9 months of 2017.
53. Id. at 3. The survivor does not need to decide whether to send the record immediately,
and even if her record is not matched, she can choose to send the record at a later point. Id.
at 5.
54. See id. at 3.
55. See generally Ian Ayres & Cait Unkovic, Information Escrows, 111 MICH. L. REV.
145 (2012).
56. Id. at 150.
57. Id. at 148.
58. See Ian Ayres, Meet Callisto, the Tinder-Like Platform That Aims To Fight Sexual
Assault, WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/using-
game-theory-technology-to-fight-sexual-assaultl/2015/10/09/f8ebd44e-6e02-1 1e5-aa5b-
f78a98956699 story.html?utm terr-.aacca49d23el [https://perra.cc/S6CL-U2LH]. The
use of information escrows might extend to contexts outside of sexual harassment, including
falsification of research results or in the background check for an employer. See David D.
Laitin & Rob Reich, Trust, Transparency and Replication in Political Science, 50 POL. SC.
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology
involved (e.g., more scrutiny);5 9 however, they may wish to do so if
there are multiple people experiencing the same thing, either because
the individual recognizes that the assailant may otherwise engage in
misconduct again, or because their report gains credibility if it is not
the only one.
60
Other reporting apps include the I've-Been-Violated app, devel-
oped by the same founders as We-Consent. 61 I've-Been-Violated
prompts a survivor to make a time-stamped video where one can
speak about the assault.62 The survivor can then contact the police or a
university office, and they, in turn, can reach out to the app developer
to obtain the video.
63
Lighthouse, another competitor of Callisto's, allows survivors
as well as witnesses -to report an assault.64 According to Lighthouse,
once a report is completed, it is "automatically sent to the Title IX
coordinator for the student's campus, but Lighthouse can also choose
to send it to campus security, the local police department, and/or the
regional Office for Civil Rights, ' 65 in contrast with Callisto, which
allows users to delay reporting. After the report has been sent, "users
and [university] officials can see who has logged in, viewed the re-
port, and so on.
' 66
C. Prediction
Finally, in conjunction with reporting, technology has also been
used to attempt to predict patterns of misbehavior. On its fact sheet,
Callisto lists "data on victimization and perpetration trends," as ag-
& POL. 172, 174 (2017); Peter Baumlhart, Social Media and the Job Market: How To Rec-
oncile Applicant Privacy with Employer Needs, 48 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 503, 524-25
(2015).
59. See Natasha Singer, The War on Campus Sexual Assault Goes Digital, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/15/technology/the-war-on-campus-
sexual-assault-goes-digital.htmi (last visited May 5, 2018).
60. Olga Khazan, Can Game Theory Help To Prevent Rape?, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 17,
2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/09/can-game-theory-prevent-
rape/405607/ [https:Hperna.cc/9XPH-W8F3]; see also Nora Caplan-Bricker, Stanford Be-
comes the Most Prominent School Yet To Adopt a Sexual Assault Reporting App, SLATE
(Apr. 27, 2017, 5:04 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx factor/2017/04/27/
reporting apps like callisto are offering students new tools for dealing.html
[https://perna.cc/E64Y-JGQ7].






64. See Claire Warner, 'Lighthouse' Independent Sexual Assault Reporting Website
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gregated by the location of assaults, 67 as a medium-term goal.68 This
is consistent with global apps, such as Women Under Siege and Har-
assMap, which document instances of harassment on a map visualiza-
tion. 69 Women Under Siege, which ceased updates in early 2016,70
was a website that aggregated reports of rape in Syria. Anyone could
file a submission, which required a written description of the incident
including its location. 71 Users were encouraged to use TOR and to
provide supplemental evidence (that is, potential eyewitnesses,
quotes, etc.). 72 Egypt-based HarassMap, whose partners include Uber
Egypt,73 is a web-based platform where users can report incidents of
both harassment and intervention. 74 When reporting harassment, the
user must provide the location and specific description of the harass-
ment. The platform is regularly reviewed "to make sure that the report
is about sexual harassment" and about a specific incident.75 Users are
also encouraged to report instances of bystander intervention. 76 As it
relates to prediction, trend analysis of aggregated data could inform
prevention efforts - for instance, observing whether there are assault
reports after a particular event. 77 However, it is important to note that
these trends might not necessarily be causal: predictive power may be
low, particularly if relatively low numbers of incidents are reported.
As one advocate points out, preventing assault is "only part of the
point... . [These technologies] can help students get information
67. See Anya Kamenetz, A Tech-Based Tool To Address Campus Sexual Assault, NPR
(Dec. 6, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2017/12/06/567605752/a-tech-
based-tool-to-address-campus-sexual-assault_(last visited May 5, 2018); Caplan-Bricker,
supra note 60; Casey Fabris, Callisto To Offer New Reporting System for Survivors of Sexu-
al Assault, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 16, 2015), https://www.chronicle.com/article/
Callisto-to-Offer-New/229407 (last visited May 5, 2018).
68. See CALLISTO, supra note 52, at 9.
69. See Salamishah Tillet, Apps (and Maps) To End Sexual Violence, THE NATION (July
17, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/apps-and-maps-end-sexual-violence/ [https:/
perna.cc/4EKY-9GPR]; see also SYLVIA WALBY ET AL., STOPPING RAPE: TOWARDS A
COMPREHENSIVE POLICY 76 (2015) (citing Brazil, Haiti, and the U.N.'s use of mobile apps
with geo-location technology for reporting and mapping).
70. See Reports, WOMEN UNDER SIEGE (Feb. 4, 2016, 9:09 PM),
https:Hwomenundersiegesyria.crowdmap.com/reports/view/273 [https://perma.cc/5XGS-Q4
2J?type-image].
71. See Submit a New Report, WOMEN UNDER SIEGE, https:/womenundersiegesyria.
crowdmap.com/reports/submit [https://perma.cc/9YQBS2HY?type-image].
72. See Digital Security & Submissions, WOMEN UNDER SIEGE, https://womenundersiege
syria.crowdmap.com/page/index/2 [https:Hperma.cc/gNF5C6KD?type-image].
73. See Tino Waked, Uber Egypt's Commitment To Prevent Sexual Harassment,
HARASSMAP (Nov. 9, 2017), https://harassmap.org/en/news/uber-egypts-commitment-to-
prevent-sexual-harassment [https://perma.cc/8CG6-NDCE].
74. See Share Your Story, HARASSMAP, https:Hharassmap.org/en/share-your-story
[https://perma.cc/M2GG-N9GD].
75. Id.
76. See What Is Intervention, HARASSMAP, https:Hharassmap.org/en/what-intervention
[https://perna.cc/9FH7-VENF].
77. See Singer, supra note 59.
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about resources when an assault does happen. '78 Nonprofit apps often
provide a list of resources, alongside their reporting mechanisms.
79
These apps appear to be an improvement over web-based resources
that schools provide. For instance, school websites may provide an
overwhelming list of resources instead of clear, direct next steps,
80
which can be confusing and overwhelming. 8 In contrast, the AskDC
app, for example, shows steps that survivors can take as one-click
buttons: talk to a counselor, obtain a survivor advocate, or schedule a
visit for medical aid.82 AskDC's approach of providing clear next
steps reduces the logistical costs for a survivor to find help and in
turn, could encourage more students to come forward.
III. EVALUATION OF EXISTING APPLICATIONS
Successful technologies relating to sexual assault need to consider
their downstream effects: Will potential targets use them? Will poten-
tial assailants be deterred by this increased usage? As stated in the
Introduction, the concerns around the Shitty Media Men list focused
on what features of technology best maximize reporting of accurate
allegations and minimize reporting of false allegations. If an accuser's
identity is anonymous, it could increase allegations overall, both true
and false; conversely, if an accuser's identity is public, allegations
might decrease overall.83 Accordingly, technologies that seek to report
sexual assault will need to consider this balance carefully and consid-
er the legal issues around privacy.
If an app is insensitive to a survivor's experience or is clunky, it
is unlikely that someone will wish to use it. Thus, technologies that
prevent an assault from happening or encourage reporting will need to
consider whether the apps actually do engage in prevention on the
ground, and whether potential targets or survivors are willing to use
the app. If there is little to no usage, the effectiveness of apps will also
be quite low.
78. Summers, supra note 29.
79. See Kassien, supra note 30.
80. See, e.g., Get Help for Sexual Violence, U. MINN. ROCHESTER, https://r.umn.edu/get-
help-sexual-violence [https://perna.cc/Y248-977K].
81. See Carol Smith, Overwhelmed and Unsure, Victims Often Delay Seeking Help,
INVESTIGATEWEST (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.invw.org/2010/02/25/overwhelmed-and-
unsure-vi/ [http://perna.cc/9W7F-F4AU]; see also generally CASS SUNSTEIN & RICHARD
THALER, NUDGE, 9-10 (2008) (explaining how an overwhelming number of options can
lead an individual to make bad choices).
82. See Sarah Rich, App Helps Victims Report Sexual Assault Anonymously in D.C.,
GOv'T TECH. (Aug. 19, 2013), htp://www.govtech.com/health/App-Helps-Victims-Report-
Sexual-Assault-Anonymously-in-DC.html [htps://perma.cc/C6BA-H8UB]; Brensilber,
supra note 51.
83. This was the intuition for making the list anonymous. See Donegan, supra note 12.
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A. Privacy
This Section evaluates the existing technologies using the Fair In-
formation Practice Principles ("FIPPs"), commonly cited guideline for
fair information practice,84 to frame the discussion around privacy and
security. The FIPPs consist of four values - Notice, Choice, Action,
and Security85 - as developed by governments in the United States,
Canada, and Europe in the 1970s.86 While the United States does not
have a codified, uniform set of privacy principles,8 7 the four FIPPs are
the basis for the privacy policies of several federal agencies through
the implementation of the Privacy Act of 1974.88 Additionally, sector-
specific statutes based on the FIPPs have been enacted in the United
States.8 9 The fact that the agencies' application of the FIPPs closely
tracks and overlaps with other fair information practice standards in
other jurisdictions, such as the OECD's Privacy Principles,90 further
supports the use of the FIPPs as the standard for this Note's privacy
analysis.
1. Notice and Choice
Under the Notice principle, consumers should receive "clear and
conspicuous notice of [websites'] information practices, including
84. See Kenneth Bamberger & Deirdre Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the
Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 254 (2011).
85. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE iii (2000).
86. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 7 (1998).
87. See An Unprincipled Future ? The Conflict Between FIPPs and the Internet of Things,
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (June 22, 2016), http://btlj.org/2016/06/an-unprincipled-future-the-
conflict-between-fipps-and-the-internet-of-things/ [https://perma.cc/8AZ8-J9X2]; see also
Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 84, at 254 ("Legal academics and privacy experts have
labeled the U.S. approach 'FIP[Ps]-Lite."').
88. See, e.g., IRS Privacy Policy, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs
.gov/privacy-disclosure/irs-privacy-policy [https://perma.cc/ZWF9-8QUM] (last updated
Sept. 18, 2017); Our Privacy Principles, CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census
.gov/about/policies/privacy/dataAprotection/ourprivacyprincipleshtml [https://perma.cc/
Q2TU-X53Q] (last updated Oct. 10, 2014).
89. See, e.g., parts of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act. See Fred H. Cate, The Failure
of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE
INFORMATION ECONOMY, 358-59 (Jane K. Winn. Ed. 2006). Note that without a statute, the
application of FIPPs in other settings typically relies on industry self-regulation. See gener-
ally Ira Rubinstein, Privacy and Regulatory Innovation: Moving Beyond Voluntary Codes, 6
I/S: J.L. & POL'Y 356 (2011).
90. ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE OECD PRIVACY
FRAMEWORK (2013), [hereinafter OECD] https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd
privacy framework.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CEA-3KVN]; see also Memorandum from
Hugo Teufel III, Chief Privacy Officer, The Fair Information Practice Principles: Frame-
work for Privacy Policy at the Department of Homeland Security (Dec. 29, 2008) [hereinaf-
ter Privacy Policy Guidance Memorandum].
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what information they collect, how they collect it,... how they use
it,... whether they disclose the information collected to other entities,
and whether other entities are collecting information through the
site."'9 ' Under the Choice principle, "sites would be required to offer
consumers choices as to how their personal identifying information is
used beyond the use for which the information was provided,"92
whether it be used inside or outside of the sites.
The Notice-and-Choice regime forms the regulatory model for
privacy in the United States.93 That is, an app or platform that collects
information- whether it is collecting recordings of consent or re-
ports of assault - would need to make sure its users understand who
has access to the data and how it will be used. However, the empirical
literature suggests that consumers may not understand the notice they
are given and may inadvertently share their information as a result.
94
Second, the convenience and facade of anonymity that electronic re-
porting provides could make a user more likely to overlook dense le-
gal writing. If reporting an assault electronically feels less triggering
to a survivor, 95 she may over-trust the platform and share more infor-
mation 96 without carefully reading how that information will be used.
Similarly, users of reporting apps might wrongly believe that
something will be immediately done by the app, rather than the insti-
tution that the app reports to (either emergency services in a preven-
91. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 85, at iii. This is similar to the OECD's Purpose
Specification Principle, which states that "[t]he purposes for [collection] should be specified
not later than at the time of data collection and the subsequent use limited to the fulfilment
of those purposes or such others as are not incompatible with those purposes and as are
specified on each occasion of change of purpose." OECD, supra note 90, at 14. Presumably,
Notice may incorporate some aspects of the OECD's Openness Principle, in which "[m]eans
should be readily available of establishing the existence and nature of personal data, and the
main purposes of their use, as well as the identity and usual residence of the data control-
ler." Id. at 15. The Notice principle also seems consistent with the OECD's Accountability
Principle, which states that "a data controller should be accountable for complying with
measures which give effect to the [other privacy] principles." Id. The Department of Home-
land Security labels notice as a Transparency principle. See DEP'T OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, supra note 90, at 3.
92. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 80, at iii. The Choice principle roughly maps onto
the OECD's Collection Limitation and Use Limitation Principles, which advise that "data
should be obtained by lawful and fair means and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or
consent of the data subject." OECD, supra note 85, at 14; see also Privacy Policy Guidance
Memorandum, supra note 85.
93. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Understanding Privacy Policies: Content, Self-
Regulation, and Markets 1-2 (N.Y.U. L. Sch. Law & Economics Research Paper Series
Working Paper No. 16 -18, 2016).
94. See OMRi BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO
KNOW 6-8 (2014).
95. In creating an app, University of Pennsylvania administrators pointed out that stu-
dents may be more comfortable with disclosure via texts rather than in person. See Brensil-
ber, supra note 51.
96. As one nonprofit leader observes, "there's no such thing as absolute confidentiality."
Fabris, supra note 67.
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tion setting, or a university or HR department in a reporting setting).
That is, there may be confusion about who the relevant authority is.
9 7
This distinction may be particularly important as between criminal
cases and university adjudications; as one police officer noted, specif-
ic information that can prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in a
charging decision might be better extracted from a trauma-informed
officer or interviewer compared to an app, whereas the information
collected by Callisto might suffice for the "preponderance of the evi-
dence" standard in the Title IX context.98 Confusion regarding the
relevant authority may be problematic, if, for instance, an individual
wishes to report to the police in the future, but only answers the
prompts at the bare minimum to avoid further traumatization- she
may think her incomplete account is sufficient. 99 Additionally, other
offenses that might surface from a matching function might not be
admissible in court.1°O
Moreover, it may not be clear who has control of the data. In the
context of Notice and Choice, individuals have to decide whether to
trust certain technologies, and what sources of information they
should use to evaluate these technologies before they consent to shar-
ing their information. The National Network to End Domestic Vio-
lence ("NNEDV") advises survivors to look at the source of the app:
"If developed by a company that does not have expertise [around as-
sault or abuse], it is likely that the app may contain information and
suggestions that are not actually considered safe or recommended by
experts." 1 1 With regard to privacy settings, NNEDV asks app devel-
opers: "Does the app work the way it is intended? ... Are disclaimers
included to inform survivors of possible safety risks? ... Does the app




For instance, one of the main concerns with the I've-Been-Violated
97. See, e.g., Tobias Salinger & Laura Bult, What You Should Know About Reporting
Sexual Assault on Campus, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 22, 2016), http:/
www.nydailynews.com/news/national/reporting-sex-assault-campus-article- 1.2759279 (last
visited May 5, 2018).
98. See Madelyn Reese, New Applications Aim To Transform and Aid Reporting of Sexu-
al Assault, DAILY U. WASH. (May 6, 2016), http://www.dailyuw.com/news/
article 7f23fc86-1339-11e6-90b7-07b5ba475d9e.html (last visited May 5, 2018).
99. Cf Sara F. Dudley, Paved with Good Intentions: Title IX Campus Sexual Assault
Proceedings and the Creation of Admissible Victim Statements, 46 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 117, 135 (2016) ("Unfortunately for a campus survivor, life has created circumstances
where it may be easier to intentionally omit or falsify a shameful detail than be entirely
candid with authorities. This erodes a survivor's credibility with authorities and contributes
to the creation of incomplete or inaccurate victim statements.").
100. See Fabris, supra note 67.
101. Nat'l Network To End Domestic Violence, Safety in a Mobile World: A Look at
Apps, TECH. SAFETY, https://www.techsafety.org/alookatapps/ [https://perna.cc/9TSN-
AUGLI.
102. Nat'l Network To End Domestic Violence, Considerations for App Developers:
Safety & Privacy for Survivors of Abuse, TECH. SAFETY, https://www.techsafety.org/
appdevelopers/ [https://perma.cc/5WBW-QEBX].
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app was that it was not necessarily clear who benefited from the app;
its creator, the Institute for the Study of Coherence and Emergence
had no clear expertise assault issues.0 3 Further, the fact that the app
was previously packaged with other apps that included We-Consent
and charged fees could seem exploitative. 1
04
Similarly, Lighthouse appears to have no formal institutional
partners yet lists schools that a user can report to. While formal insti-
tutional partners might not be required per se, several colleges sent
cease-and-desist letters so that Lighthouse would remove their names
from its website. 10 5 Lighthouse's claim that its reporting data "is en-
crypted and separate, so the company 'couldn't pull [a] report together
if [it] wanted to' also seems at odds with the statement that it in fact
pulls together reports for officials to view. 106 In contrast, in the work-
place harassment app Stoplt, "[s]ince multiple HR employees receive
the reports, their handling is less subjective, and there's a smaller
chance that a report might dead-end with a single HR worker,"'1 7 in
theory leading to faster investigation turnarounds.
103. See About Us, INST. FOR STUDY COHERENCE & EMERGENCE,
http://www.isce.edu/index-5.html [https://perma.cc/5KLK-AGPD].
104. The reported fees for I've-Been-Violated and We-Consent have varied. At the time
of its launch, We-Consent appeared to cost $5 for a yearly membership. See Meg Graham,
New Apps Urge Mutual Consent, 'Yes Means Yes,' When It Comes to Sex, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE (July 25, 2015, 5:30 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/bluesky/originals/ct-
we-consent-app-michael-lissack-b si-20 150720 -story.html [https://perna.cc/QB4E-ZG94].
Later, We-Consent and I've-Been-Violated became free apps, while other apps called Party-
Pass (an electronic consent pledge) and What-About-No charged $5 per download. See
Ciara O'Callaghan, Mobile App "I've-Been-Violated" Helps Those Affected by Sexual As-
sault, PENN STATE DAILY COLLEGIAN (Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.collegian.psu.edu/news/
campus/article a2257d7a-ec76-11e5-ba61-93bdc6eca2b4.html [https://perma.cc/TZJ7-
RUXZ]; see also Party Pass, WE-CONSENT, http://we-consent.org/index.php/41-apps-
abcd/104-party-pass-appwha [https://perna.cc/Q5JB-VCCX] (description of Party-Pass);
What About No, WE-CONSENT, http:/we-consent.org/index.php/41-apps-abcd/ 102-what-
about-no-app [https://perma.cc/9EM8-QG4V] (descriptions of What-About-No). At various
points, the suite of four apps appeared to be priced as a $5 bundle. See Aleah Milliner, Sex-
ual Abuse Victims Will Have a Way To Record Evidence Through Free iTunes App, THE U.
DAILY KANSAN (Feb. 2, 2016), htp://www.kansan.com/news/sexual-abuse-victims-will-
have-a-way-to-record-evidence/article 4795d7 lc-c9ec- 1e5-9c7a-07fea36fc415.html
[https://perna.cc/9GN2-T9Q3]; Katherine Speller, Do Consent Apps Really Work" Here's
Why It Doesn't Matter, MTV (July 29, 2015), http://www.mtv.com/news/2226330/consent-
theres-an-app-for-that/ [https://perma.cc/M42L-4G3B]. Currently, there is no fee to down-
load I've-Been-Violated or We-Consent. See Apps Are Free, WE-CONSENT, htp://we-
consent.org/index.php/get-the-app-suite [https://perma.cc/F3SR-L6XR].
105. See Tyler Kingkade, Why Colleges Are Worried About a New Sexual Reporting
Website, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/rape-
reporting-website-colleges us 5720e4b5e4b0b49df6a9c8c4 (last visited May 5, 2018).
106. Warner, supra note 59.
107. Greenfield, supra note 32.
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2. Access
Under the Access principle, consumers should have "reasonable
access to the information a Web site has collected about them, includ-
ing a reasonable opportunity to review information and to correct in-
accuracies or delete information." 1i °S Here, the most intuitive
interpretation of when the Access principle might be violated is in the
case of false accusations. This could theoretically occur for two rea-
sons. First, consider the probability in the Callisto app that two indi-
viduals incorrectly name the same assailant, "John Smith," resulting
in a report being erroneously sent to a university. Currently, Callisto
attempts to correct for this error by requesting a unique ID (a Face-
book URL to avoid matching common names), 10 9 but the assailant
may look similar to or may have pretended to be John Smith. Howev-
er, if the real John Smith is able to show that he was perhaps some-
where else at the time, in a criminal adjudication, this issue could be
clarified at the point of investigation even without changes to the plat-
form.
More ominously, one might consider a deliberate effort to accuse
an individual. Based on the fact that technology appears to reduce the
cost of reporting, we could expect that false accusations might in-
crease. 110 However, this does not account for (1) the low rate of false
accusations overall,"' which might be in turn due to the fact that ac-
cusers, in addition to making a report, may have to engage in other
time-consuming efforts related to their accusation,i 2 (2) undercount-
108. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 85, at iii; see also OECD, supra note 90, at 14
("Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for which they are to be used, and, to the
extent necessary for those purposes, should be accurate, complete and kept up-to-date.");
Privacy Policy Guidance Memorandum, supra note 85, at 4 ("DHS should, to the extent
practicable, ensure that P1 [personally identifiable information] is accurate, relevant, time-
ly, and complete."). The Access principle also parallels the OECD's Individual Participation
Principle. See Privacy Policy Guidance Memorandum, supra note 85, at 3 ("DHS should
involve the individual in the process of using PII [personally identifiable information] and,
to the extent practicable, seek individual consent for the collection, use, dissemination, and
maintenance of PII. DHS should also provide mechanisms for appropriate access, correc-
tion, and redress regarding DHS's use of PH1.")
109. See Reporting Options, CALLISTO, https:Hstanford.callistocampus.org/reporting/
[https://perma.cc/RB78-VG69].
110. Cf Lee & Suen, supra note 83, at 3 (suggesting a real victim is more inclined to de-
lay the cost of reporting while a libeler may come forward immediately).
111. See David Lisak et al., False Allegations of Sexual Assault: An Analysis of Ten
Years of Reported Cases, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1318, 1318 (2010).
112. See Michaela Cross, How Campus Rape Victims Get Hurt by the Laws That Are
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ing," 3 and (3) the fact that false reports are likely to be made at a
lower rate than accurate reports. 114
In certain databases, such as the Shitty Media Men spreadsheet, it
may seem problematic that anonymous individuals might contribute
to a database of misconduct. However, the specificity of the claim
should allow individuals to make their own judgments about whether
that claim is true or not. For instance, with HarassMap, moderators
regularly check the site to make sure that reports of harassment are
specific to a location or behavior, in order to limit the possibility of
false accusations.
115
Another take on Access might question whether an individual
should even know that there is data that relates to an accusation
against them. A reporting system, including perhaps a "whisper net-
work," assumes that if a harasser knew they were being gossiped
about, they might curb or become more subtle in their behavior (i.e. a
deterrent effect)." 6 One could imagine that a serial harasser would be
deterred from continuing his or her behavior if this information be-
came public.
3. Security
Finally, "sites would be required to take reasonable steps to pro-
tect the security of the information they collect from consumers."
1 17
Under the OECD Framework, reasonable steps are aimed against
"loss or unauthorised access, destruction, use, modification or disclo-
sure of data."" 8 While all of the reporting platforms state that their
data is encrypted, 119 an encrypted database is not impossible to access,
particularly if an individual is motivated enough. 20 Also, while no
113. See Corey Yung, How To Lie with Rape Statistics: America's Hidden Rape Crisis,
99 IOWA L. REv. 1197, 1204 (2014).
114. See Lee & Suen, supra note 83, at 3.
115. See Share Your Story, supra note 74.
116. See Conor Friedersdorf, How To Identify Serial Harassers in the Workplace, THE
ATLANTIC (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/11/whisper-
networks-20/546311 /[https://perna.cc/8GXH-UVE2].
117. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 86, at iii.
118. OECD, supra note 90; cf DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 90 ("DHS
should protect Pl (in all media) through appropriate security safeguards against risks such
as loss, unauthorized access or use, destruction, modification, or unintended or inappropriate
disclosure.").
119. See, e.g., What We Do, CALLISTO, https://www.projectcallisto.org/what-we-do
[https ://perna.cc/P65B-WUUY]; Core Features, LIGHTHOUSE, http:lighthouse.
vertiglolabs.com/features.html [https:Hperna.cc/ZPS3-XFUN]; Google Play, I've-Been-
Violated, https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id-edu.isce.violated&hl-en [https:/
pena.cc/P65B-WUUY].
120. See Anna North, A New Way To Report College Sexual Assault, N.Y. TIMES:
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anonymous information is necessarily revealed, aggregated data might
reveal specific information inadvertently. Consider, for example, a
map that indicates a relatively small number of incidents in a specific
location. A defendant who has participated in an incident in that loca-
tion may be more likely to believe someone has accused them
should he or she somehow obtain access to this information. 12' Alter-
natively, given that demographic data is collected in Callisto and
Lighthouse, 122 knowing the race of a survivor might narrow down
whether he or she has reported. Now consider the theoretical example
of a university that is not particularly racially diverse. If a survivor of
color reports her assault to an app or platform that collects demo-
graphic data, it may be possible to identify who made the report. In
particular, when other data is present (e.g., location), the ability to de-
anonymize a report becomes significantly increased.
4. Incentives to Adopt Technological Interventions
Altogether, this FIPPs framework allows us to briefly consider
the privacy mechanics of these technologies. However, one outstand-
ing question concerns accountability: who is liable for the down-
stream consequences? One intuition is that employers or universities
would not want to adopt any of these technologies. As the founder of
Callisto asserted, some tech companies declined to use the app not
only because "[t]hey're nervous about having a third party collect
data," but also because "[t]hey don't want to know. "123 First, if an
employer hosts a database of accusations, they might be liable for
libel under certain conditions. 124 This concern might be alleviated by
the presence of a third-party escrow to which the liability would pass.
Second, employers are obligated to investigate claims of harass-
ment by supervisors, depending on the circumstances. 125 Similarly,
case law indicates if universities know of problematic areas on cam-
pus, a lack of corrective action might be viewed as a lack of "reasona-
ble care."'1 2 6 But without that information, they may not have to
121. Even if that is somewhat illogical statistically, assuming that the defendant does not
have baseline data.
122. See Our Policies, CALLISTO, https:Hstanford.callistocampus.org/about/our-policies/
[https://perma.cc/56FH-7CE9]; Warner, supra note 64.
123. See Sara Ashley O'Brien, She Wants Her Rape Reporting Software To Be Universal,
CNN (Mar. 31, 2017, 12:44 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/03/31/technology/callisto-
sexual-assault-software/index.html [https:perma.cc/NW2G-KXXS].
124. See Huet & Bergen, supra note 49.
125. See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON
VICARIOUS EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS (1999),
available at https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html [https://perra.cc/8V9N-
C62L].
126. See id. (collecting cases); see also Mullins v. Pine Manor C., 449 N.E.2d 331, 336
(Mass. 1983) ("Parents, students, and the general community still have a reasonable expec-
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dedicate resources to address the issue, both in terms of money and
time. 127 Still, however, the threat of high-profile cases may change
institutions' outlook: public press tied Stanford's adoption of Callisto
with the Brock Turner case. 128 And there is a possibility that universi-
ties have an obligation to gather information about their employees
and students. 129 Another suggestion might be for law enforcement to
partner with or adopt these technologies, 3 ° given that it could lead to
more effective use of resources.
B. Increasing Take-Up
If after a university adopts one of these technologies it desires
more preventative or predictive power around assault, then it will
need to increase take-up of the app, that is, encourage survivors to
report otherwise unreported experiences. Moreover, high take-up may
also create a social norm in which it may not be clear whether some-
one with the app is a bystander or survivor, which could enhance re-
porting rates. 131
Additionally, increasing take-up might be important because if
only a few individuals use the app, then the use of the tool will heavi-
ly rely on the veracity of these few reports. 132 As a result, the tool
might privilege certain types of survivors or narratives in the same
way that prevention tools might reinforce stereotypes. In particular,
several professors have expressed concerns about Harvard Universi-
ty's misconduct policy because it could have a "disproportionate im-
pact on racial minorities of discipline for campus sexual
misconduct. 1133 That disproportionate impact may come from a
tation, fostered in part by colleges themselves, that reasonable care will be exercised to
protect resident students from foreseeable harm."); see generally Andrea Curcio, Institu-
tional Failure, Campus Sexual Assault and Danger in the Dorms, 78 MONT. L. REv. 31
(2017) (analyzing campus sexual assault and schools' duty to use precautionary measures to
protect students living in dorms); cf Doe v. Emerson C., 153 F. Supp. 3d 506, 515 (D.
Mass. 2015) ("[J]t does not follow that Emerson could reasonably be expected to anticipate
and prevent a sexual assault occurring at an off-campus party.") (emphasis added).
127. See generally DEP'T. OF EDUC., Q&A ON CAMPUS SEXUAL MISCONDUCT (2017).
128. See, e.g., Khari Johnson, Stanford University To Pilot Sexual Assault Reporting
Software Callisto, VENTUREBEAT (Apr. 27, 2017, 10:56 AM), https://venturebeat.com/
2017/04/27/stanford-university-to-pilot-sexual-assault-reporting-software-callisto/ [https:/
perma.cc/8F9S-ACY6].
129. See Eugene Volokh, Tort Law vs. Privacy, 114 COLuM. L. REV. 879, 899-900
(2014).
130. See Fabris, supra note 67.
131. See Rich, supra note 82.
132. See generally Sarah Jane Brubaker et al., Measuring and Reporting Campus Sexual
Assault: Privilege and Exclusion in What We Know and What We Do, 11 SOC. COMPASS
e12543 (2017) (analyzing bias in sexual assault incident reporting).
133. Elizabeth Bartholet et al., Fairness for All Students Under Title L, DIGITAL ACCESS
TO SCHOLARSHIP HARV. (Aug. 21, 2017), https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/
956
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skewed sample of reports. To address this concern, increasing take-up
of technologies seems important to mitigate bias.
In particular, interventions should be inclusive of those individu-
als who may not have an obvious institution to which to express
grievances. First, industry-wide spreadsheets might name employed
individuals, but accusers might not work in the same company as the
defendant, making reporting procedurally difficult. Similarly, gig
economy and freelance workers, particularly when unionized, may not
have protections given their contractor status. 3 4 Future interventions
can and should be tailored to these networks.
As the Washington Post points out in its discussion of the Shitty
Media Men spreadsheet,
[B]athroom and barroom warnings [have] passed be-
tween women for generations in written form. Those
have long been the best hope of women seeking to
shield themselves and their peers from sexual as-
sault, because many feel that making a public accu-
sation and allowing a man to respond rarely works,
that using official channels rarely works, that even
filing suit often doesn't work.'35
In this way, reporting technology is a modem form with several theo-
retical benefits: it reduces the social costs around reporting by allow-
ing for the "matching" function of reports against the same person and
for the ability to send an account electronically rather than recounting
it in person. 3 6 It also reduces the logistical costs by allowing third-
party verification for the timing of a survivor's recollection and allow-
ing for distribution quickly.
1/33789434/Fairness%20for%/020All% 20 Students.pdPfsequence 1 [https://perma.cc/XEG4-
VCFC].
134. See, e.g., Jones v. A.W. Holdings, LLC, 484 Fed. App'x 44, 48 (7th Cir. 2012);
Hunt v. State of Missouri, Dep't of Corr., 297 F.3d 735, 741 (8th Cir. 2002) ("The law is
well established that Title VII protects employees, not independent contractors, from dis-
criminatory employment practices."). But see Hunt, 297 F.3d at 741 ("[T]he existence of a
contract referring to a party as an independent contractor does not end the inquiry, because
an employer may not avoid Title VII by affixing a label to a person that does not capture the
substance of the employment relationship.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Schwieger v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of Neb., 207 F.3d. 480, 483 (8th Cir. 2000); see general-
ly Have You Experienced Harassment as a US Tech Employee or Worker in the Gig Econ-
omy?, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 23, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
business/2017/aug/23/share-your-experience-harassment-gig-economy-tech
[https://perra.cc/W2A8-QED5] (attempting to collect reports).
135. Molly Roberts, How BuzzFeed Helped Turn a Secret List of Potential Abusers in
Media into a Burn Book, WASH. POST: POST PARTISAN (Oct. 12, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lblogs/post-partisan/wp/2017/10/12/how-buzzfeed-turned-
a-secret-list-of-potential-abusers-in-media-into-a-bum-book/ (last visited May 5, 2018).
136. See generally Heidi Liu, Do Androids Dream of Bad News?, 15 CANADIAN J. L. &
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1. Design
Simple design principles are important in pursuit of the goal of
increasing take-up. 3 7 As mentioned previously, 3 8 a list of resources
can be overwhelming: while that might seem a small cost, the psycho-
logical literature suggests that it is these logistical tensions that might
lead someone not to follow through on what they consider to be im-
portant actions. 1
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As it relates to preventative technologies, consent app Good2Go
is one example of poor design. As Slate described, not only do poten-
tial partners click through a series of screens for consent, but if one
partner does not have the app downloaded, he or she must use her
phone to verify her number- altogether taking four minutes.
140
Moreover, only one party's level of intoxication is recorded, 14 1 which
could be problematic as a potential assailant could simply claim he
was drunk. Alternatively, he could persuade his potential partner to
click "Intoxicated but Good2Go" instead of "Pretty Wasted," which
would allow the app to proceed.1
4 2
There are also differing opinions on the use of smartphones them-
selves in increasing take-up. The founder of Circle of 6 defends her
smartphone app by stating that "[m]ost young people first report sex-
ual assault to a friend or a peer, not to the police or a blue safety
light... [a]nd they're always on their phone."'1 43 In contrast, Callisto
removed its app feature because it felt survivors would be uncomfort-
able with having a visible app on their phones.1 44 One academic paper
that evaluated the information escrow mechanism underlying Callisto
yielded survey evidence that individuals would be more likely not
only to report an assault with the matching mechanism, but also pos-
sibly to make a formal complaint on their own. 145 That is, the option
to report to Callisto does not cause survivors who might otherwise
make a (informal or formal) complaint to simply store their report in
137. See Anwar, supra note 36.
138. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
139. For instance, individuals may hesitate in applying to college, see generally Adam
Lavecchia, Heidi Liu & Philip Oreopoulos, Behavioral Economics of Education, in
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 1 (Eric A. Hanushek, Stephen Machin &
Ludger Woessmann eds., 2016), or obtaining a flu shot, see generally Katy Milkman et al.,
Using Implementation Intentions Prompts To Enhance Influenza Vaccination Rates, 108
PNAS 10415 (2011).
140. See Hess, supra note 41.
141. See id.
142. Cf id.
143. Summers, supra note 29.
144. See Cassie Werber, The Culture of Secrecy That Fuels Campus Rape Has a Tech
Solution, QUARTZ (May 4, 2017), https:Hqz.com/973539/the-culture-of-secrecy-that-fuels-
campus -rape-has-a-tech-solution-called-callisto/ [https://perna.cc/5NCS-VYLZ].
145. See Ian Ayres, Voluntary Taxation and Beyond: The Promise of Social-Contracting
Voting Mechanisms, 19 AM. L. &ECON. REV. 1, 39 (2017).
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the system instead. 146 Comparing the relative reporting rates between
a phone and web interface could be worthwhile.
2. Cultural Stereotypes of Harassment/Assault
A first-order objection to tools that primarily emphasize harass-
ment/assault prevention is that it puts the onus on victims to ensure
their own safety. 147 A related concern is that they may undermine pri-
vacy generally - simply allowing someone (even a friend) to follow
one's walking path via iPhone requires a certain sacrifice of privacy.
Even if the individual opts into this sort of technology, it can create an
expectation that avoiding misconduct requires sacrificing privacy.
Moreover, preventative tools imply a particular stereotype of as-
sault.148 Many of those listed earlier 149 involve loud sounds and alerts,
suggesting that the stereotypical assault comes from a stranger 50
however, the majority of assaults are committed by someone the vic-
tim knows.' 5' Additionally, one of the primary objections to the I've-
Been-Violated app, which records consent, is that consent can change
at any time - accordingly, recording consent at any one point might
be unrealistic or misleading and reinforce the stereotype that consent
for one action implies consent for other actions. 5 2 Indeed, the founder
of I've-Been-Violated justified his use of the app name based on the
claim that students otherwise "send each other vague signals on the
assumption that the other person knows what you're talking
about"'53 - reinforcing stereotypes about how targets might send
"mixed signals." The fact that We-Consent- launched by the same
institution as I've-Been-Violated- "self-destructs" if someone says
146. Id.
147. See Sirin Kale, The Complicated Promise ofAnti-Rape Technologies, VICE (Oct. 2,
2017, 10:26 AM), https://broadly.vice.com/en us/article/xwg75j/the-complicated-promise-
of-anti-rape-technologies (last visited May 5, 2018.
148. See generally Rena Bivens & Amy Adele Hasinoff, Rape: Is There an App for
That? An Empirical Analysis of the Features of Anti-Rape Apps?, INFO., COMM. & SOC.
(2017), https:Hdoi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2017.1309444 (last visited May 5, 2018) (con-
ducting an empirical analysis of the features of anti-rape apps).
149. Summers, supra note 27.
150. See Tara Culp-Ressler, Profit and Peril in the Anti-Rape Industry, THINKPROGRESS
(Sept. 10, 2014, 2:45 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/profit-and-peril-in-the-anti-rape-
industry-e497c0l7b0ec/ [https://perma.cc/8E7N-28UW].
151. See Perpetrators of Sexual Violence: Statistics, RAINN, https://www.minn.org/
statistics/perpetrators-sexual-violence [https://perma.cc/K7BZ-H7BX].
152. That is, one can imagine a bad actor asking for consent for one thing and using it to
justify other acts. The easy remedy for this would be to record continuously, but that could
require an unreasonable sacrifice of privacy, as described in the last paragrapl According to
I've-Been-Violated and We-Consent's creator, the Apple App Store rejected the apps be-
cause they were "icky." See Molly Petrilla, Can An App Help Reduce Sexual Assault on
College Campuses?, FORTUNE (Sept 1, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/09/01/affimnative-
consent-app/ (last visited May 5, 2018).
153. Reese, supra note 93.
No. 2]
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology
no,154 instead of providing a video record and sending an alarm
suggests that perhaps its use could be more beneficial for assailants.
The experience of survivors in using these tools should be of first-
line importance. Emotional discomfort stemming from the app (as
opposed to from the experience itself) is likely to decrease take-up of
these tools. As one Slate contributing writer points out, "[t]he best
sexual assault apps seem to be the ones that drastically speed things
up and that monitor data in a way that analog reporting and counsel-
ing can't. But technology alone can't change the human dynamic at
work here."'1 55 In 2016, researchers from Stanford University and the
University of California found that digital assistants (e.g., Apple's
Siri, Microsoft's Cortana) did not recognize when an individual was
looking for resources for sexual assault. 156 While this issue was im-
mediately corrected - by directing most of the inquiries to the num-
ber of the National Sexual Assault Hotline 157 - Critics suggested that
these quick fixes were a symptom of a larger insensitivity.158
3. Standards for Reporting
In contrast to the sensitivity problems described above, reporting
apps like Callisto, HarassMap, or Women Under Siege allow someone
to tell their specific story. For example, Callisto touts its trauma-
centered approach. 159 Features of the platform include encouragement
for the survivor to take breaks so as not to be overwhelmed, and for
their description of the experience to not necessarily follow a linear
pattern, 160 so that it may be easier to deal with recall. However, critics
have pointed out that asking someone to look up their assailant on
Facebook, as Callisto does, could be triggering, 161 although Callisto
stated that they had not seen that in their user survey feedback. 1
62
The ability to report narratives may cause the threat of backlash.
Opponents of the anonymous reporting documents discussed above
154. See Apple, supra note 38.
155. Nora Caplan-Bricker, This App for Victims of Sexual Assault Is a Terrible Idea
and It's Not an Outlier, SLATE (Jan. 19, 2016, 5:18 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/
xx factor/2016/01/19/app for victims of sexual assault is a terrible idea and it s not
an outlier.html (last visited May 5, 2018).
156. See Adam Miner et al., Smartphone-Based Conversational Agents and Responses to
Questions About Mental Health, Interpersonal Violence, and Physical Health, 176 JAMA
INTERNAL MED. 619, 623 (2016).
157. See Michael Nedelman, Sin Now Understands Questions About Sexual Assault After
Study Critiqued Automated Responses, ABCNEwS (Mar. 30, 2016, 2:20 PM), http:/
abcnews.go.com/Health/siri-now-understands-questions-sexual-assault-study -critiqued/
story?id=38031759 [https:Hperma.cc/PRQ2-JVS7].
158. See, e.g., SARA WACHTER-BOETTCHER, TECHNICALLY WRONG 6 (2017).
159. See Callisto, supra note 49, at 3.
160. See id.
161. See Singer, supra note 55.
162. Id.
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might call this "political correctness" run amok, since the behaviors
cited in the "Shitty Media Men" spreadsheet ranged from misogynis-
tic behavior to felony assault,' 63 and the "Yes, at Google" email list
included things that might not rise to the level of unlawful harass-
ment. 164 A relatively low-barrier solution to this objection would be
for reporting apps to provide information on what is a criminal act in
the state that the user is located. It seems extremely likely that many
non-lawyers might not understand that criminal statutes are deter-
mined at the state level, and that there are different wordings for each
sort of crime. Similarly, for actions that do not necessarily fall under a
criminal statute, reporting apps can provide information on which
behaviors are problematic even if they may not be punishable by a
court or institution.
On the other hand, one potential issue with a codified system of
reporting is that "[i]t might allow people who have survived sexual
assault to get over the first-mover disadvantage, but it may also codify
an entrenched attitude that women need to have corroborating evi-
dence to be believed."'1 65 Consider the earlier example in which an
individual reports the bare minimum to avoid retraumatization.
166 If
she later adds more information, it seems possible that the time-
stamped entry will account for that revision, and could be misper-
ceived as her revising her account. To that extent, cultural change
might be necessary. The #MeToo movement may reflect that cultural
change may be underway167 : even though many of the recent harass-
ment claims required significant numbers of survivors to speak up,
one might suggest that the multiplicity of claims lowers the social and
logistical barriers for an individual claim to be raised. Finally, what
should lawmakers do, given that repeat offenders likely and deliber-
ately target women who they believe are less likely to report an as-
sault? 16' Does this enhance the promise of predictive technologies?
IV. CONCLUSION
This Note examined the current scope of technologies around
sexual assault. Altogether, the use of these technologies highlights the
163. See Shafrir, supra note 1.
164. See Huet & Bergen, supra note 47.
165. Singer, supra note 55.
166. See supra Section III.A. 1.
167. See, e.g., Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Har-
assment Accusers for Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/10/05/us/harvey-weinstein-harassment-allegations.html (last visited May 5, 2018);
Abby Ohlheiser, How #MeToo Really Was Different, According to Data, WASH. POST (Jan.
22, 2018, 4:22 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersectl/wp/2018/01/22/
how-metoo-really-was-different-according-to-data (last visited May 5, 2018).
168. See generally Amy Blackstone, Christopher Uggen & Heather McLaughlin, Legal
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No. 2]
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology
tension in attempting to reconcile the needs of a survivor and the
needs of the legal system. The rhetoric around these technologies re-
lies heavily on a discussion of changing the existing culture from that
of "rape culture." The developers of these technologies do not neces-
sarily guarantee that the action an institution takes will be satisfactory
to the individual. 169 Instead, advocates argue that the tools "do some-
thing more." 170 "They innovatively engage and redefine the bystander
as friends, guardians, survivors of gender-based violence, volunteers
and witnesses, in order to reduce the likelihood of individual and col-
lective acts of sexual violence.'
7 1
In the years since the 2011 Dear Colleague letter that laid out
standards for university investigations of sexual assault, 172 commenta-
tors have argued that harassment prevention is "now an exploding
industry with everything from fingernail polish that detects date-rape
drugs in drinks to necklaces that hide mini panic buttons - and all
kinds of crash courses on how to get and give consent.' 73 Although
the Department of Education withdrew guidance around sexual as-
sault reporting in universities earlier this year Still, although the De-
partment of Education withdrew guidance around sexual assault
reporting in universities earlier this year,1 74 it seems important to
evaluate the claims of these technologies - whether well-intentioned
or not- in an evidence-based fashion, given the "watershed mo-
ment" of recent disclosures of harassment. 1
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There will - at least for a while - be new tools to evaluate. As
Jia Tolentino states:
Speech about sexual assault can stem from a variety
of worthy motivations: to warn other women, to find
closure and catharsis, to enact or perform solidarity,
to get an abusive person out of a position of power,
to change institutional procedures. These goals can
overlap, and they often do- but not automatical-
ly... It would help.., if we understood that at-
169. "It's not just about the specific bystander skills, it's building a culture that is less ac-
cepting and less tolerant of sexual violence." Summers, supra note 27.
170. Tillet, supra note 64.
171. Id.
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174. Department of Education Issues New Interim Guidance on Campus Sexual Miscon-
duct, DEP'T OF EDUC. (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/department-
education-issues-new-interim-guidance-campus-sexual-misconduct [https://perna.cc/Y3W4
-HZ29].
175. Jessica Taylor, Speaker Ryan on Sexual Harassment: "We Are Having a Watershed
Moment in This Country", NPR (Nov. 30, 2017, 5:59 PM), https://www.npr.org/
2017 /11/30/567588841/speaker-ryan-on-sexual-harassment-we-are-having-a-watershed-
moment-in-this-count (last visited May 5, 2018).
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tempts to repair a flawed system are unlikely to be
either perfect or categorically wrong. 1
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176. Tolentino, supra note 2.
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